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Abstract
The emergence of the influenza (H1N1) 2009 virus provided a unique opportunity to study the evolution of a pandemic
virus following its introduction into the human population. Virological and clinical surveillance in the UK were
comprehensive during the first and second waves of the pandemic in 2009, with extensive laboratory confirmation of
infection allowing a detailed sampling of representative circulating viruses. We sequenced the complete coding region of
the haemagglutinin (HA) segment of 685 H1N1 pandemic viruses selected without bias during two waves of pandemic in
the UK (April-December 2009). Phylogenetic analysis showed that although temporal accumulation of amino acid changes
was observed in the HA sequences, the overall diversity was less than that typically seen for seasonal influenza A H1N1 or
H3N2. There was co-circulation of multiple variants as characterised by signature amino acid changes in the HA. A specific
substitution (S203T) became predominant both in UK and global isolates. No antigenic drift occurred during 2009 as viruses
with greater than four-fold reduction in their haemagglutination inhibition (HI) titre (‘‘low reactors’’) were detected in a low
proportion (3%) and occurred sporadically. Although some limited antigenic divergence in viruses with four-fold reduction
in HI titre might be related to the presence of 203T, additional studies are needed to test this hypothesis.
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Introduction
In April 2009, several human cases of swine influenza A/H1N1
were confirmed in the USA and Mexico [1]. The viruses
responsible were characterised as a novel influenza A H1N1 with
a combination of genes not previously detected in human or swine
population [2,3]. The virus rapidly spread to several countries,
leading the World Health Organisation in early June to raise the
level of pandemic alert to phase 6, as sustained community-level
transmission of the virus was taking place in more than one region
of the world [4]. Pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 viruses were
detected for the first time in the United Kingdom (UK) in late
April, with the subsequent epidemics manifesting in two broad
waves from April to August and September to December.
Mathematical modelling estimated that during the first wave of
pandemic 320,000 (range 144,000 – 670,000) persons presented
symptomatic illness [5].
Gathering antigenic and genetic information about pandemic
virus strains was a key task during the 2009 influenza pandemic. It
provided a unique opportunity to study the evolution of a novel
virus immediately subsequent to its introduction into the human
population, so as to understand the genetic pathways underlying
the emergence of viral diversity. Global influenza surveillance
focuses on monitoring the antigenic and genetic characteristics of
circulating influenza strains to aid formulation, with adjustment if
necessary, of the annual influenza vaccine composition. Therefore,
datasets of HA sequences used in most studies represent influenza
strains with unusual antigenic properties or severe clinical
outcomes.
In the present study we focus on the analysis of genetic and
antigenic characteristics of a set of pandemic H1N1 (2009) viruses
with particular advantages, as they were: a) isolated during the first
and second pandemic waves in the UK; b) carefully selected to
represent chronology, age, severity and geographical distribution
and to avoid antigenic bias; c) analised in the context of
phylogenetic relationships nationally and globally; d) linked with
antigenic data. We investigated the dynamics of circulation of
significant genetic variants and the correlation between genetic
diversity and antigenicity during the progression of the pandemic
in a single country with distinct epidemic waves, high use of
prophylactic antivirals and discrete geographical boundaries.
Results
Clinical and virological surveillance and phylogenetic
analysis
The earliest detection of pandemic H1N1 in the UK was on
April 27
th 2009, at the end of the 2008/09 winter period, in two
returning travellers from Mexico, followed by further introduc-
tions from travellers from the USA and Mexico. By early June
there was sustained community transmission within the UK (weeks
27 to 33 [6]), giving a clear first wave of virus circulation, unlike
most European countries which only experienced sporadic or no
activity [7]. A second wave of virus circulation occurred during the
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period, 28,567 respiratory specimens were tested. A total of 4,673
cases were laboratory confirmed as pandemic H1N1. Peak weeks
of virus detection corresponded with peaks of clinical morbidity.
We sought to sequence a representative proportion (10–15%) of
laboratory-confirmed cases (Figure 1). Isolates were chosen in
order to ensure a uniform coverage geographically, chronologi-
cally, clinically and by age group across the period of study (Figure
S1). The bias towards younger age groups seen in lab-confirmed
cases is coincident with the highest rate of consultation and also
with the highest seroincidence in the 5–14 age group during the
first and second wave of pandemic in the UK [8,9]. A total of 685
HA complete coding region sequences from UK viruses (353 from
the first wave, 332 from the second wave) plus 475 worldwide HA
sequences downloaded from the NCBI Influenza Virus Resource
[10] were used to reconstruct a phylogenetic tree by Bayesian
methods (Figure S2). For ease of visualisation and analysis, a subset
of 100 UK and 50 non-UK viruses were subsequently selected to
represent those clusters containing 10 or more sequences (Figure 2).
The HA phylogeny is relatively shallow, with large polytomies
and the maximum depth of the tree (from root to furthest tip)
being 10 nodes, indicating close evolutionary relationships and
subsequent lack of phylogenetic resolution. This is unsurprising,
given the short period of time of circulation in humans. The
median substitution rate over the period was estimated by
Bayesian means at 0.004981 per site per year, although it should
be understood that calculating this required estimating divergence
times and the estimated substitution rate encompassed a wide
range. The majority of viruses, except some early examples located
at the root of the tree, group together in a single cluster,
characterised by substitution 203T. This cluster includes several
minor subclusters which are mostly characterised by other single
amino acid substitutions. For these subclusters, some temporal
accumulation of substitutions was observed as they include viruses
from either the first or the second wave, with bootstrap values of
.50%. The coexistence of different clusters indicates co-
circulation of lineages. Outside these clusters, most viruses appear
on branches with an unresolved topology, consistent with lack of
diversity within their HA.
The topography also illustrates that the UK population of
viruses is essentially part of the global circulation pool, with several
clusters containing UK sequences aligned with geographically
distant relatives. Two clusters show a predominance of UK viruses
with one US virus, suggesting that a related virus strain from the
USA may have seeded those from the UK. However there are
some wholly native lineages, including three extended clusters in
the second wave that contain only UK sequences. This is
consistent with some extended evolution and variation being
entirely contained within the UK following chains of transmission,
although further sampling may reveal highly related sequences
from outside the country. It is important to note that the UK has
an extended phase of ‘‘containment’’ with widespread use of
prophylactic antivirals during the first weeks of the pandemic
between May and June 2009. These analysis indicate that the use
of antivirals did not lead to an unusual circulation of variants in
the UK.
Polymorphism and amino acid changes in HA
Genetic analysis of H1N1 (2009) viruses indicated that the HA
amino acid sequences were largely similar (sequence similarity of
Figure 1. Estimated case numbers & laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic and seasonal influenza, England, 2009. The estimated
number of symptomatic cases with ILI due to pandemic influenza was calculated each week using a statistical model which relies on data from
various surveillance systems: the primary care-based QSurveillance scheme, sentinel virological surveillance schemes and data from the National
Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS) [61]. Number of pandemic H1N1 viruses selected for sequencing of HA per week is also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.g001
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strain, A/California/07/2009. A maximum difference of 12
substitutions was seen between two viruses from the second wave.
Only one virus, A/England/201/2009, isolated on 2
nd May 2009
from a returning traveller from Mexico, had an identical HA
sequence to that of the vaccine strain; whole genome sequencing
confirmed this virus was identical in all gene segments to the
vaccine strain (Baillie, Galiano et al, unpublished observations).
We analysed the variation in frequency over time of those
signature amino acid changes characterising clusters from the
phylogenetic trees of Figures 2 and S2. A signature amino acid
change is defined as a substitution found exclusively in all
sequences within a designated cluster. Figure 3 represents
variation month-by-month using the sequence logo format [11].
The most significant observation of this analysis was that
substitution S203T gradually increased in frequency from April
(44%) to predominate in 100% of viruses from August onwards, a
finding consistent with this change also characterising the main
branch of the phylogenetic tree (Figure 2). However, a few viruses
found later in November-December 2009 showed signs of
reversion at this position (203S). Other substitutions appeared
with variable frequencies during the pandemic waves. Substitution
L32I was seen in up to 23% of viruses from the first wave and 12%
from the second wave. Notably, this change characterised two
distinct lineages in the tree: a set of first-wave viruses exhibiting
203S and a second-wave group with 203T, suggesting that a new
variant exhibiting 203T plus 32I arose during the second wave. In
addition, five viruses from November-December which showed
32I had reverted to 203S and clustered with those viruses from the
first wave (Figure S2). Change D222E appeared from June
onwards in up to 39% and 13% of viruses from the first and
second wave respectively. Sporadic occurrence of polymorphism
at this position was also detected with change D222G showing in
1–3% of the viruses. Polymorphisms at position 222 have been
previously associated with severe clinical outcome [12,13,14].
Amongst UK viruses, substitution D222G appeared in 5 of 25 fatal
cases, compared to 2 of 668 of non-fatal cases (p value=0.0001,
chi square test). Change D222E was present in 6 of 25 fatal cases
vs. 98 of 635 of non-fatal cases (p value=0.494). In addition,
positions 222 and also 203 are located within antigenic site Ca
[15], suggesting a possible role for these changes in the generation
of antigenic variants.
Most cluster amino acid signatures emerged later during the
second wave, perhaps reflecting an accumulation of diversity as is
characteristic of influenza viruses. While most second-wave
changes were constantly found in around 10–15% of the viruses,
substitution E374K notably increased in frequency from 8% in
September to 51% in December. Only substitution Q293H was
observed in 6% of first-wave viruses but then disappeared after
August.
Given the possible relevance of some of these changes on the
evolutionary pathways of the H1N1 (2009) viruses, we next sought
additional insight by analysing selective pressures acting on the
HA deduced protein sequences. To help highlight differences
across time, and reduce data to a computationally manageable
size, two datasets were constructed using UK sequences collected
either during the first or second waves. Figure S3 shows 3
positively selected sites identified in sequences from the first wave
and 15 from the second wave, whereas 12 negatively selected sites
were found during the first wave and 6 during the second wave.
An interesting progression in selection over time is revealed here,
with the first wave period featuring mainly negative selection and
the second wave mainly positive. Some of negative selection in the
first wave could be explained by initial rapid epidemic spread in a
largely naı ¨ve population coupled with analysis over a short time
period. More intensive sampling may detect more transient,
weakly deleterious mutations, i.e. those that persist for a small
number of generations before being selected to extinction usually
because they do not contribute to the virus fitness. The
disappearance of these mutations will in turn create the
appearance of greater negative selection relation to more long
term and less intensive sampling, that will not have observed the
mutations in the first instance. Circumstantial evidence for this is
given by the occurrence of several amino acid substitutions other
than those described in Figure 3 which were sporadically seen in
one or a few viruses but did not persist. This would be followed
later by increased purifying selection leading to the spread of
viruses with advantageous mutations. Three out of 12 sites
featuring cluster signature substitutions (84, 222 and 374, Figure 3)
were found to be subjected to positive selection mostly during the
second wave, suggesting that they may offer some advantage either
in terms of adaptive changes to the new host or immune escape.
Moreover, position 222 was shown to be consistently subjected to
positive selection across both waves, which may reflect its
involvement in receptor binding specificity [16].
Antigenic analysis
For seasonal influenza, detection of viruses with greater than
four-fold reduced reactivity in haemagglutination inhibition (HI)
titre compared with a reference prototype strain homologous titre
can be an indication of significant antigenic variation. Such viruses
are considered as ‘‘low reactors’’. Given that HI test is a biological
assay, the variation which occur within the parameters of the test
mean that only four-fold or greater reduction in antigenic
reactivity has biological significance. We looked at antigenic
characterization data (n=847) using HI tests with post infection
ferret antisera to A/California/07/2009 (vaccine strain), A/
England/195/2009 (UK reference strain) and A/Brisbane/59/
07 (2008/09 and 2009/10 seasonal H1N1 vaccine strain). The
analysis revealed that 97% of pandemic H1N1 (2009) viruses were
antigenically similar to A/California/7/2009 (Figure 4a). There
were very few (3%) viruses with a greater than four-fold change in
reactivity to A/California/07/2009 antiserum (low reactors).
When compared to the last influenza season where the seasonal
H1N1 influenza subtype had predominated (2007–2008) a similar
proportion of ‘‘low reactor’’ viruses was observed (Figure 4b), with
no statistically significant difference (p value=0.287, chi square
test). However, the proportion of viruses with four-fold reduced
reactivity in the HI titre to the vaccine strain was significantly
higher among the pandemic viruses compared to those detected
during 2007–2008 (30% vs. 6% for viruses with four-fold reduced
reactivity, p value=0.0001). It is relevant to note that the
antigenic analysis of pandemic viruses relied on the use of a single
reference ferret antiserum, in contrast to analyses carried out for
seasonal influenza, with a panel of reference antisera.
Figure 2. Phylogenetic relationship of full length HA sequences of pandemic influenza viruses isolated in the UK. Viruses from an
illustrative subset of 100 were included, as well as additional 50 worldwide viruses, all collected between April and December, 2009. Tips are tagged
and coloured according to whether viruses were isolated during the first or second wave. The tree was rooted with A/California/07/2009 as the
outgroup. Branch lengths are drawn to scale. Signature amino acid changes are annotated at the nodes of each cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.g002
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and antigenic data available (n=234). In order to investigate
whether any of the signature residues described in Figure 3 could
be related to a change in the antigenic reactivity, we cross-
matched viruses grouped by their signature changes with their
reactivity to A/California/07/2009 antiserum (Table 1). At least
30% of viruses with single substitution 203T or accompanied by
374K, 370H and other minor variants showed four-fold or
greater reduced reactivity to A/California/07/2009 antiserum,
although only a few of them exhibited greater than four-fold
reduction (‘‘low reactors’’). Amongst them, viruses with substitu-
tions 56D and 84N were associated with four-fold or greater
reduced reactivity to A/California/07/2009 antiserum in 82%
and 75% of viruses respectively. It is notable that ‘‘low reactor’’
viruses were distributed throughout the phylogenetic tree (Figure
S2).
Figure 3. Amino acid changes seen in UK viruses, April – December, 2009. Sites are described using H1 numbering with the HA protein
sequence of the vaccine strain A/California/07/2009 used as reference sequence. The logo describes the amino acid changes by displaying the one-
letter symbol that codes each amino acid (according to IUPAC – IUB nomenclature) in the proportion seen amongst the analysed viruses. The number
of viruses presenting each change is indicated below the logos, with frequencies in brackets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.g003
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associated with variation in the antigenic reactivity, we mapped
them onto a surface representation of the HA trimer from a
pandemic H1N1 (2009) representative strain (A/Darwin/2001/
2009, PDB: 3M6S) [17] with highlighted antigenic sites, as
described by Xu, Ekiert et al [15]. Residue 203T is located in
antigenic site Ca although does not contribute to the surface of the
molecule, being unclear whether it has any effect on the antigenic
Figure 4. Antigenic reactivities of influenza H1N1 viruses isolated in the UK. Percentage of viruses with different antigenic reactivities as
per reduction in HI titres against: a) A/California/07/2009 (pandemic H1N1 2009) antiserum. b) A/Solomon Islands/3/06 (seasonal H1N1) antiserum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.g004
Table 1. Antigenic reactivity of pandemic influenza (H1N1)
2009 viruses from UK (n=227).
Amino acid
signature
a N6 Wave
,4-
fold
b 4-fold .4-fold
N( % ) N( % ) N( % )
203S, 32I 4 First 3 (75) 1 (25) 0 (0)
293H 1 First 1 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
203T only 91 First-Second 61 (67) 27 (30) 3 (3)
203T, 370H only
c 10 Second 4 (40) 6 (60) 0 (0)
203T, 370H, D501N 8 Second 5 (62.5) 3 (37.5) 0 (0)
203T, 370H, 56D 11 Second 2 (18) 7 (64) 2 (18)
203T, 374K only 37 Second 22 (59) 14 (38) 1 (3)
203T, 374K, 84N 12 Second 3 (25) 8 (67) 1 (8)
203T, 374K, 97N 7 Second 5 (71) 1 (14) 1 (14)
203T, 374K, 302E 12 Second 8 (67) 4 (33) 0 (0)
203T, 32I 11 Second 5 (45.5) 5 (45.5) 1 (9)
203T, 222E 23 Second 16 (69) 6 (26) 1 (4)
Viruses are grouped according with amino acid signature changes described in
Figures 2 and 3. Substitutions located within the signal peptide were not
considered.
aAmino acid changes are described using as reference the sequence of A/
California/07/09.
bRefers to ,4-fold, 4-fold and .4-fold dilutions of antiserum against A/
California/07/09. Viruses with .4-fold reduced antigenic reactivity are
considered as ‘‘low reactors’’. Compared with the vaccine strain antiserum, the
titres with A/England/195/2009 antiserum were within one-fold of difference
in most cases and all the pandemic viruses showed no reactivity against A/
Brisbane/59/07 antiserum; therefore these results are not included in the
analysis.
cGroups where .50% of the viruses shows $4-fold reduced reactivity are
highlighted in bold letter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.t001
Figure 5. Surface representation of the hemagglutinin hetero-
trimer from a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 strain [17]. Antigenic sites
Ca (Orange), Cb (Blue), Sa (Pink) and Sb (Cyan) and residues of interest
(56A [seq:73] (red), 84A [seq:101] (purple), 203A [seq:220) (dark green),
370B (HA2 43) [seq:387] (yellow) and 374B (HA2 47) [seq:391] (light
green) are highlighted. Residue 203 is in a buried position only visible
when residues 218, 238 & 239 are removed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023779.g005
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sequence shows that 56D and 84N are flanking antigenic site Cb
(not shown), Figure 5 reveals that both changes are located in close
proximity to antigenic sites Ca and Cb. Changes 370H and 374K,
however, are located in the stalk region, far from the four antigenic
sites and therefore do not seem to significantly affect their
structure. Glycosylation can also mask protein epitopes to evade
immune recognition. Although some of these changes also
involved the replacement or the addition of asparagine (N), none
were related to the acquisition of additional potential N-
glycosylation sites or their loss.
Discussion
Since the first cases of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009
infections were detected in late April until December 2009,
covering the first two waves of the pandemic, there were 784,000
estimated clinical cases of pandemic influenza in the UK [8]. The
estimation of number of cases in the second wave was almost twice
that in the first wave (502,000 vs. 285,500)[18]. A peculiarity of the
circulation of the pandemic virus within the UK is that it caused
widespread transmission during the summer months of 2009 (first
wave), despite extensive use of antiviral prophylaxis. In contrast,
virtually all European countries experienced only a sporadic
spread or small, local outbreaks over this period [6,7]. Analysis of
HA sequence diversity over the first two waves indicated that UK
strains were closely related genetically to the current vaccine strain
A/California/07/2009, with no obvious segregation of strains by
geographical location, as observed by others [19]. Earlier strains
were genetically more similar to the prototype than later strains,
an observation consistent with the temporal accumulation of
amino acid changes in the HA [20]. Overall genetic diversity
among pandemic viruses was less than typically seen among
seasonal influenza [21,22], which can be attributed to a shorter
evolutionary history since divergence, as the time of most recent
common ancestor (TMRCA) for the pandemic virus was estimated
around January 2009 [3,23,24]. The observed rate of substitution
is similar to that estimated by Rambaut et al. [24], although higher
than other estimations [3,25]. This may be a sign of virus
adaptation to the human host over our (longer) period of study.
The majority of substitutions characterising specific clusters in
the tree are contained in no more than a dozen sites; some have
been also reported by others [26,27,28]. We observed that, while
some substitutions are plausibly the result of founder effects or
early fixation, other polymorphisms coexist for extended periods,
indicating the co-circulation of different variants. Widespread
circulation of multiple viral strains in geographically distant places
has been observed, confirming that global viral migration
constituted a key element in the spread of the pandemic, as also
seen for seasonal influenza [29].
In our study, 30% of 2009 UK viruses exhibited four-fold
reduced reactivity to the vaccine strain antiserum compared with
6% for seasonal H1N1 influenza in 2007–2008. There are
limitations in comparing the seasonal H1N1 influenza subtype
which has circulated extensively in humans with the pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 which has just emerged from an animal host as other
factors could account for this variation in addition to immune
selection. We emphasize that only a small number (3%) of viruses
with greater than four-fold reduction (low reactors) were detected
which were distributed throughout the phylogenetic tree, thus
representing different lineages and enforcing the sporadic nature
of their emergence. These are the viruses from which we might
expect an expansion of lineage for the emergence of the next
antigenically drifted variant. Despite 30% of viruses with four-fold
reduction, no antigenic drift was detected during the second wave
of 2009 and the vast majority of pandemic viruses were still
considered as antigenically similar to the vaccine strain. The
limited antigenic divergence seen in pandemic viruses from 2009
did not lead to antigenic drift during the subsequent influenza
season (third wave) in 2010–2011 ([30], HPA unpublished data),
therefore the recommended vaccine strain for H1N1 (2009)
subtype is still A/California/07/09 for the next winter in the
Northern hemisphere [31].
Most viruses described in Table 1 were isolated during the
second wave and exhibited substitution S203T, which has
potential to contribute to antigenic drift as it is located within
antigenic site Ca, although its buried position leaves uncertainty
about its effects [15,32]. It is possible that this substitution affects
the antigenic structure of the HA sufficiently to be responsible for
the 30% of four-fold antigenic divergence. Given that there are
few viruses without 203T to compare with, it is not possible to
deduce whether 203T is necessary and sufficient to produce
antigenic drift and additional studies should be conducted. It is
also unclear whether the predominance of 203T could be
attributed to immune selection or it is a consequence of further
adaptive changes to the human host or optimisation of viral fitness.
Factors supporting the latter include the fact that this change
characterizes all viruses circulating in the UK (and elsewhere) from
July onwards and has been highlighted as one of five substitutions
across the genome of H1N1 (2009) strains that are concomitantly
present in all recent pandemic viruses, characterising a new
genetic variant that has replaced the viruses originally circulating
in April 2009 (Baillie, Galiano et al, unpublished observations;
[33]). Change 203T is still present in all UK HA sequences from
the winter of 2010–2011 (third wave) [34]. The fixation of this
change has occurred too quickly to be attributed to immune
selection. Even when a substantial proportion of older adults have
shown to have pre-existing immunity against the H1N1 (2009)
virus [9,35] and could be considered as a potential source of
immune pressure during the early spread of the pandemic, the
highest rates of infection were by far observed in school-age
children and young adults (Figure S1 and [8]), therefore the
population affected by the time 203T became fixed was largely
naı ¨ve. On the other hand, substitutions at position 203 have not
been previously described as potentially adaptive mutations, with
the caveat that most studies have used avian influenza sequences
[36,37,38].
Although most cluster-related signature changes were observed
during the second wave, when we may expect to have more
pressure for immune-driven changes as a significant proportion of
the population will have been infected, the great majority were
located outside any known antigenic site. Some of them were
shown to be under positive selection, such as those at positions 84,
222 and 374. Substitution N84S (also referred as N101S) has been
highlighted as fixed amongst H1N1 (2009) strains compared to
previous seasonal H1N1 influenza, where less than 1% of viruses
had 84S [39]. Reversion to the ‘‘seasonal’’ residue S84N may be a
sign of further adaptation to the human host. Moreover, 75% of
UK pandemic viruses with reversion to the ‘‘seasonal’’ residue
S84N have a trend to lower antigenic reactivity. Substitution
D222G has been observed to correlate with cases of severe or fatal
disease. We found an increased frequency of substitution 222G in
pandemic viruses isolated from fatal cases compared to viruses
from non fatal cases. The difference between these groups was
statistically significant, as also reported by others [12,13,14].
Substitutions at position 222 were previously shown to induce
alterations in the receptor binding site [40]. Recent studies
revealed that 222G variants bind a broader range of a2-3-linked
Evolution of H1N1/09 in the UK
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on epithelia within the lung and suggested that these features of
222G mutants may be responsible for the exacerbation of disease
[41,42], but the exact relationship between 222G and case fatality
is undetermined, since it appears neither necessary or sufficient for
case fatality. Substitution E374K has been increasingly detected in
up to 51% of UK viruses, in more than 80% of viruses from
Singapore and in up to 40% of global isolates from December
2009 [33]. It has been identified as part of a highly conserved
epitope in the 1918 H1N1 virus with a possible role in membrane
fusion [43]. Changes in the antigenicity of this epitope would not
necessarily be reflected in HI assays. The majority of viruses with
changes 84N, 56D and 370H present (as well as 203T) showed
four-fold or greater reduction in their antigenic reactivities.
Unexpectedly, none of them was located within known antigenic
sites, but there were no other relevant amino acid substitutions
that could explain this trend. Structural analysis showed that 56D
and 84N are located close to antigenic sites Ca and Cb. Although
370H is located in the stem region of the HA, it also form part of
the same epitope that includes 374K, as mentioned above [43].
Some of these substitutions involve a change in polarity which may
alter the distance to nearby amino acids that form part of the Ca
site and thus indirectly alter the epitope conformation.
In summary, extensive analysis of the HA sequences from UK
pandemic viruses isolated during 2009 revealed limited genetic
diversity when compared to the circulation of seasonal influenza A,
consistent with a shorter evolutionary time. Co-circulation of
variants distinguished by specific amino acid substitutions was seen
across a wide geographic spread. No antigenic drift occurred during
2009 as viruses considered as ‘‘low reactors’’ were detected in a low,
non-significant proportion (3%). This conclusion is consistent with
previous observations showing that, for seasonal influenza A,
antigenic drift does not usually occur during a single epidemic
season [44]. This is also a clear example that the cause-effect
relationship between amino acid substitutions in the HA protein
and the antigenic profile of influenza viruses is the result of a
complex biological interaction, as also seen by antigenic mapping
[22]. Whilst there is increasing recognition of the utility of sequence
analysis for surveillance, development of antigenic profiles based
solely on amino acid changes and their structural location within
antigenic sites is not yet possible. This study highlights the caveats
for analysis of diversity based only on sequence analysis and
emphasises the need for phenotypic or antigenic characterisation.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Samples were taken during routine diagnostic work up by the
hospital or community physicians. Only anonymised patient data
(regional location, age, sample collection date) were used for this
analysis. This was an observational study undertaken as part of
pandemic surveillance. It was carried out under UK legislation
NHS Act 2006 (section 251), which provides statutory support for
disclosure of data by the NHS, and their processing by the Health
Protection Agency (HPA) for communicable disease control.
Written informed consent and explicit ethical approval was not
sought for this reason. Health Protection Scotland is also
embedded as part of the NHS in which the sharing of outbreak
and investigation data is undertaken as part of their role in the
coordination of national outbreaks.
Influenza viruses used in this study
Respiratory samples were submitted to the Respiratory Virus
Unit, Centre for Infections (CfI), HPA as part of influenza
surveillance in the UK. Specimens detected as positive for
pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 virus by laboratories in the
Regional Microbiology Network (RMN) were sent to RVU for
confirmation and virological investigations. These include speci-
mens from patients hospitalised with influenza and community
samples taken by general practitioners (GPs). Community samples
were also obtained via the existing Royal College of General
Practitioners (RCGP) influenza surveillance scheme for seasonal
influenza which was extended into the summer months of 2009
since the outbreak of pandemic H1N1 at the end of the 2008/09
influenza season. Additional respiratory samples were also
received as part of pandemic flu surveillance through a community
based self-sampling scheme for pandemic influenza (NHS Direct/
NPFS for National Pandemic Flu Service) established in England
from May 2009 to February 2010.
Combined nose and throat swab specimens were analysed at
CfI by real-time RT-PCR for detection of influenza A, and
subtyped for seasonal H1, H3, and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses
[45,46,47,48]. Prior to June 2009, pandemic H1N1 virus was
diagnosed by sequencing of the influenza A PCR amplicon [45],
and from June onwards by a swine lineage N1 real-time PCR
confirmatory assay [46]. For non-sentinel samples from hospital-
ized patients, prior to June influenza A unsubtypable specimens
were confirmed at CfI for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus; after June
2009, confirmatory testing of non-sentinel samples was performed
in the referring laboratories.
Influenza virus isolation and antigenic characterisation
Viruses were isolated from clinical specimens either in Madin-
Darby canine kidney cells (MDCK) or the SIAT1 derivative [49]
in the presence of 1.25 mg/ml of trypsin and stored at 280uC. A
haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay was used for antigenic
characterisation of virus isolates using a standard method. Briefly,
post-infection ferret sera to the influenza virus reference strains A/
California/07/2009 (vaccine strain), A/England/195/2009 (UK
reference strain) and A/Brisbane/59/07 (the previous seasonal
H1N1 vaccine strain) were treated with receptor-destroying
enzyme (RDE) (Denka Seiken, Japan) to remove non-specific
inhibitors. Reference viruses and virus isolates were standardised
to 8HAU and incubated with serial dilutions of ferret sera. The HI
titre was defined as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum
which still inhibited virus agglutination of turkey red blood cells.
Virus isolate HI titres were compared to reference virus
homologous HI titres to determine reactivity.
Sequencing of full length HA
685 viruses were chosen for sequencing of the complete coding
region of the HA gene. Virus RNA was extracted from either
aliquots of original respiratory material or from viral isolates using
either the QIAxtractor robot (Qiagen Ltd, West Sussex, England)
or the NucliSENS easyMag system (bioMe ´rieux UK Ltd,
Hampshire, England). Reverse transcription was performed using
Superscript III RT reverse transcriptase (Invitrogen Ltd, Paisley,
England) following manufacturer’s instructions and the universal
primer for influenza Uni12 [50]. The complete coding region of
the HA gene was then amplified using Platinum Pfx, a proof-
reading DNA polymerase (Invitrogen). Primers for amplification
and sequencing were supplied by Eurofins MWG Operon
(Ebersberg, Germany) and are available upon request. RT-PCR
products were prepared for sequencing by purifying with Ampure
magnetic beads on the Biomek NxP robot (Beckman Coulter,
High Wycombe, England).The cleaned PCR products were used
for sequencing with the ABI Big Dye Terminator Kit v3.1
(Applied Biosystems) followed by clean-up of products with the
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Coulter). Automated sequence detection was performed on a 48-
capillary ABI 3730 Genetic Analyser (Applied Biosystems,
Warrington, UK). PCR clean up and sequencing reactions were
performed by the Genomic Services Unit at the Department for
Bioanalysis and Horizon Technologies, CfI. Raw sequencing data
was edited and assembled into contigs using Sequencher 4.9 [51].
Genbank accession numbers are listed in Supplementary Infor-
mation (Dataset S1).
For the integrity and consistency of data and updates, sequences
were deposited in a custom PostgreSQL database designed in-
house. Ease and consistency of access was achieved via a custom
in-house web application (HPA Influenza Isolates database http://
www.hpa-bioinformatics.org.uk/influenza_isolates), and integrat-
ed with epidemiological data via an interface with BioNumerics
5.10 [52] and LIMS software.
Sequence accession numbers. All the sequences were
submitted to GenBank. Accession numbers are detailed in
Dataset S1.
Phylogenetic analyses
Alignments were prepared and edited as above. A phylogeny
was reconstructed with Bayesian inference via MrBayes [53], with
an appropriate substitution model chosen via jModeltest [54].
Convergence of the Markov chain was judged by the sum of split
frequencies, PSRF (potential scale reduction factor) and visual
inspection of the likelihood plot. One-hundred samples were
collected and a consensus tree constructed. This and other trees
were visualized with Dendroscope V2.3 [55]. BEAST [56] was
used with a relaxed model of molecular evolution to calculate
divergence times and thus the estimated rate of substitution at
every node. These were used to calculate an overall median rate of
substitution.
Potential N-glycosylation sites in the deduced amino acid
sequences were predicted using NetNGlyc version 1.0 [57]. Only
sites featuring the sequence Asn-Xaa-Ser/Thr without Proline at
Xaa and a potential score above the threshold of 0.5 were
considered as predicted glycosylated sites.
The structural image of the HA trimer was created using
PyMOL version 1.1 [58]. The California/2007/HA amino acid
sequence was aligned separately against the A and B chains of the
3M6S structure [17], allowing amino numbering to be mapped
directly from sequence to structure. Chains G to L were excised
from the structure of 3M6S to leave a single, 6 chain,
representation of the HA structure. The molecular surface of the
HA was calculated using a probe of 1.4 Angstroms radius and the
residues corresponding to the antigenic sites and residues of
interest, identified in the alignment, were coloured as described.
Analysis of selective pressures
Selection pressures were evaluated via the Datamonkey suite
[59]. The evolutionary model for analyses - HKY85 - was selected
with jModeltest and HyPhy [60]. Due to an excess of faint
selection signals, the relatively small amount of evolutionary time
and to avoid possible methodological problems, several approach-
es were used to assess selection: Single Likelihood Ancestral
Counting (SLAC), Fixed-Effects Likelihood (FEL) and Random
Effects Likelihood (REL) methods. Results were classified as
having good significance (i.e. a p-value,0.1 or a Bayes factor .10)
or strong significance (i.e. a p,0.01 or a Bayes factor .100).
Given the limitations of the data and the possibility of false
positives, the pool of possible sites was winnowed down to those
that had demonstrated at least 1 strongly significant result, or two
results of good significance. Two subsets were tested, using the
sequences collected from the first and second waves of pandemic
2009.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Lab-confirmed cases vs sequenced cases by
age group (A) and geographical region (B). The highest
proportion of lab-confirmed cases in the 5–14 age group is
coincident with the highest rate of consultation and also with the
highest seroincidence in this age group during the first and second
wave of pandemic in the UK [8,9].
(TIF)
Figure S2 Phylogeny of sequenced UK HA sequences.
Evolutionary tree constructed by MrBayes and coloured according
to first or second wave viruses. Nodes labelled with posterior
probabilities. A/California/07/2009 used as outgroup. Antigen-
ically low reactor viruses are boxed and labelled.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Amino acid positions of HA from pandemic
influenza (H1N1) 2009 under positive or negative
selection. Three different methods within the DataMonkey suite
were used: Single Likelihood Ancestral Counting (SLAC), Fixed-
Effects Likelihood (FEL) and Random Effects Likelihood (REL)
methods. A consensus approach was used where only those sites
with strong evidence from one or more methods or good evidence
from two or more methods were listed. The magnitude of selection
is given as dN-dS as calculated by REL.
(TIF)
Dataset S1 Genbank accession numbers of UK sequenc-
es used in this study.
(DOC)
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